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COURT OF APPEALS, 1957 TERM

be reformed to include oral agreements only when the parties intended the terms
of the oral agreement to be written into the written contract but failed to do so
because of mutual mistake or unilateral mistake plus fraud" and does not apply
to those oral agreements which were not intended to be written into the contract.9
As the dissent pointed out in the instant case, the plaintiff, as he himself alleged,
was authoritatively informed by the defendant that the oral agreement would not
be incorporated in the written agreeement but would merely be entered in the
company records and hence the majority decision seems to go well beyond the
traditional holdings regarding the remedy of reformation.
Apparently the effect of the Court's decision is to extend reformation, on
grounds of policy considerations, to plaintiffs who, but for the fraudulent inducement of the other party, would have had the intention to incorporate the terms in
the written contract rather than restricting it to persons who actually entertained
such an intention.
Suit for Real Estate Commissions Under Expired Contracts
Plaintiff broker sued defendant lessee on a management contract which
provided in part that plaintiff was entitled to commissions on any sublease consummated after termination of the agreement if authorized negotiations looking
toward that sublease were pending when the contract was terminated. 9
After two years of authorized negotiations with the state of New York for
a new sublease of space then occupied by the state, defendant notified the state
and plaintiff that it would require possession of the premises upon expiration of
the existing lease. Notwithstanding this notice, plaintiff continued to carry on
negotiations with the" state. A short time later, defendant rejected plaintiff's
proposals for a new lease and, in accordance with the terms of the contract,
defendant notified plaintiff that it elected to terminate the agreement.
When the state failed to vacate, defendant commenced proceedings in three
courts.10 Two years later, with the state still in possession, a settlement of the
dispute was effected in the form of a new lease which was much more advantageous to defendant than anything proposed by plaintiff. Plaintiff claims its
commission on this new lease.
8.
Safety
9.
9.

5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §1549 (Rev. ed. 1937); Lewitt & Co. v. Jewelers'
Fund Soc., 249 N.Y. 217, 164 N.E. 29 (1928).
Ibid. Also see Greene v. Smith, 160 N.Y. 533, 55 N.E. 210 (1899).
Douglas Real Estate Management Corp. v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,

4 N.Y.2d 33, 171 N.Y.S.2d 852 (1958).
10. Montgomery Ward asked injunctive relief in the County Court, filed
notice of intention to file claim in the Court of Claims, and brought an action
under Article 15 of the Real Property Law in the Supreme Court.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
The questions presented for the determination of the court were whether
defendant's acts effectively terminated authorized negotiations before the contract
was ended, and if so, whether these acts and the termination of the contract itself
were in good faith.
Even if it could not show performance of the contract, plaintiff could recover
under Sibbald v. Bethlehem Iron Co." if it showed that performance was prevented by the acts of defendant taken ". . . in bad faith and as a mere device to
escape payment of the broker's commission." The theory of that case was that a
principal's right to revoke his agent's authority to conclude negotiat.ons approaching success, should be limited to situations where the revocation was prompted
2
fairly by a view of the principal's interests.'
In finding for plaintiff, the Official Referee concluded that negotiations were
were pending when the contract ended and that plaintiff had performed all of
its terms.
By a 3 to 2 vote, the Appellate Division reversed and dismissed the complaint. The majority held that defendant's notice requiring possession, terminated
all authorized negotiations. The court felt that the expense and delay accompanying defendant's proceedings against the state negated the theory that defendant's purpose was to deprive plaintiff of its commissions or to drive a hard bargain
with the state. The majority viewed the new lease as a good faith settlement of
the controversy, the practical effect of which was to offer defendant a greater
expectation of the state's yielding possession at an earlier date than would the
continued prosecution of the litigation.
Pointing to the fact that a judgment in the Supreme Court action could not
be enforced by execution against the state,13 the dissent called defendant's prosecution of that action ". . . simply another phase of the large and nebulous term
'negotiations' on the part of the appellant." The dissenters viewed defendant's
acts as attempts to improve its bargaining position rather than sincere efforts to
gain possession of the premises.
In affirming 4 to 3, the Court of Appeals split along the same lines. The
Court found no authorized negotiations pending when the contract ended and no
bad faith on the part of defendant. The dissenting judges voted to reverse for
the reasons stated in the dissenting opinion of the Appellant Division.
The inability of either court to approach unanimity in this case does not
reflect disagreement on the principles of law involved. Rather, the divergent
11.
12.
13.

83 N.Y. 378 (1881).
Ibid.
N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr §659.
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opinions suggest the inability of the parties to establish conclusively the motivating
factors behind defendant's acts.
Suit against Stockholder by Creditor of Corporation -

Per Curiam

The stockholder of a corporation told the president orally that if the corporation would engage in an advertising campaign, he would personally reimburse it.
The Court dismissed this action by the advertising agency inasmuch as the agency
was "at best an incidental beneficiary rather than a third-party creditor beneficiary."'14 However, the defendant's defense of the Statute of Frauds was rejected
since the promise was not made to the plaintiff but to a third person.15
Contracts in Restraint of Trade - Per Curarn
In Paramount Pad Co. v.Baumrind,16 the Court, in a per curiam opinion,
held that a contract with a former employee which not only prohibited him from
solociting or divulging the names of plaintiff's customers, but also required him to
obtain plaintiffs written permission before accepting any position in the shoulder
pad industry, imposed an unreasonable restraint, going beyond plaintiff's legitimate interests. Therefore, the contract was void' 7 and an action was properly
dismissed which was based upon its breach and inducement of its breach.

CORPORATIONS
Stockholders' Derivative Actions
In Tropper v.Bysshe' the appellant, who owned less than two-tenths of one
per cent of the stock of the Camden Forge Company,2 brought a derivative stockholder's action in its behalf, naming as defendants Camden and a parent corporation which held more than 98% of Camden's stock. An order was entered
pursuant to section 61(b) of the General Corporation Law requiring appellant
to post security for expenses which Camden might incur in the action.
Section 61(b) requires a stockholder bringing a derivative action to post
security for reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, which security inures
14. Tomaso, Feitner and Lane, Inc. v. Brown, 4 N.Y.2d 391, 175 N.Y.S.2d
73 (1958).
15. 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §460 (1936).
16. 4 N.Y.2d 393, 175 N.Y.S.2d 809 (1958).
17. N. Y. GENERAL BUSINESS LAw §340.
1. 4 N.Y.2d 397, 175 N.Y.S.2d 811 (1958).
2. Plaintiff-appellant owned 200 shares of Camden's common stock, the total

market value of which was approximately one thousand dollars.

